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Critical Thinking 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This special issue of TIES deals with the complex topic of critical thinking in 
intelligence analysis and decision-making in medicine, specifically such as in the 
high-risk environment of the operating theatre. The work reported here was initially 
presented at the 9
th
 Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making that took place in 
London, UK (Wong & Stanton 2009).  NDM9 brought together researchers in 
naturalistic decision making and computing, intended to discuss the effect of modern 
technology on decision making that take place is settings such as medical diagnosis 
and treatment, command and control, and financial markets. This selection of papers 
gives us a deeper appreciation of earlier naturalistic decision making models, such 
Klein’s Recognition Primed Decision model. They signal a departure from what were 
largely descriptive explanations, in a way that helps us understand the relationships 
between the different modes of analysis, reasoning, decision making and problem 
solving. 
 
Despite the obvious differences in domain, intelligence analysis and medical or 
surgical decision-making and diagnosis share many aspects of the critical thinking 
process, such as uncertainty, time pressure, multiple competing hypotheses, often 
multiple competing goals, and risk.  Within the papers there is some cross reference 
within and between domains, which reinforces this view with meta-cognitive 
monitoring emerging as a common skill. 
 
Critical thinking has received significant attention within psychology and most 
particularly within the field of education (Halpern & Williams, 2008). Experts 
working within this area question if indeed we will be smart enough to meet the ever 
increasing demands upon critical cognition within the workplace across a range of 
expert domains.  Sternberg’s (1997) seminal work combined with Halpern provides us 
with evidence that suggests that critical thinking can be taught and acquired, hence the 
deliberate use of skills and strategies can not only increase a desirable outcome, they 
can be learned in ways that transfer to novel contexts.  Whilst some contradictory 
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evidence exists about skill transfer across domains of application or expertise, overall 
the benefits of critical thinking skills appear to support what we know about what we 
know; i.e. cognitive self-awareness enhances thinking process and decision-making.  
 
Intelligence analysis 
 
Two of the papers in the special issue deal with critical thinking in the domain of 
intelligence analysis. 
 
Klein (Critical thoughts about critical thinking) argues that critical thinking may be 
considered as both the thinking skills themselves and the meta-cognitive skill of 
analysing the reasoning process for the purpose of critiquing and improving those 
skills.  Critical thinking skills are likely to include iterative and cyclic activities, such 
as problem solving, development of competing hypotheses, calculating probabilities 
and making decisions.  Klein suggests that the introspective aspect of meta-cognitive 
skills is beset with difficulties, although critical thinking skills require the reflective 
feedback as part of the learning cycle for improvement.  The intelligence community 
are keen to avoid mistakes in their analysis, but Klein argues these are rarely due to 
lack of diligence; rather they are inherent in the processes and procedures themselves.  
He contrasts the twin, and often competing, goals of ‘increasing insights’ and 
‘reducing mistakes’ which may act as opposing forces in intelligence analysis.  The 
process of reducing mistakes might interfere with gaining insights and vice versa.  
Klein provides examples of sources of error in the processes, such as: overlooking 
breaks from tradition, the clutter of too many competing hypotheses, focusing on 
logic checking rather than pattern matching, using declarative rather than procedural 
knowledge, and becoming bogged down in the technology and bureaucracy.  Looking 
at evidence from other domains (for example, medicine) Klein suggests that ‘adaptive 
problem solvers’ are likely to be the most successful intelligence analysts as they use 
their initial ‘hunch’ as a guide for exploration, testing and accepting or rejecting as 
they go.  He argues for a dual pathway model for critical thinking that exploits the 
combination of intuitive ‘insight’ and formal ‘analysis’ to be used concurrently.  The 
insight path resembles recognition primed decision making (Klein, 1993), which 
allows analysts to intuit coincidences as meaningful discoveries or correspondence 
with important implications.  Experience enables the skilled analyst to spot 
 4 
meaningful connections in the data.  By way of contrast, the analysis path is more 
explicitly procedural, using the traditional tradecraft of the intelligence community 
with the tools and techniques for gathering and assessing evidence to evaluate 
competing hypotheses. The implication of this juxtaposition is that it is the interaction 
between ‘insights’ and ‘analysis’ that leads to breakthroughs.  Klein proposes that 
ideas from both pathways should be subjected to a plausibility filter and, presumably, 
cross referenced.  Similar hypotheses emerging from both pathways may deserve 
special attention – although Klein does not speculate how the products of these two 
pathways should be blended, but recognises the importance of both paths working 
together.   
 
Hoffman, Moon, Moore and Litman (Reasoning difficulty in analytical activity) 
consider intelligence analysis as cyclic activities that comprise: goal definition, 
hypotheses formulation, uncertainty identification, information gathering and 
hypotheses testing.  Despite this process driven view of intelligence, the success or 
otherwise of the analysis seems to be highly dependent upon the knowledge, skills 
and abilities of the analyst, including their understanding of history, culture, context 
and language of the subject under investigation together with the interpersonal traits 
of persistence, creativity, reasoning and organisational skills.  Hoffman et al explain 
that intelligence analysis is difficult for a number of reasons, such as the inherent 
nature of the subject matter and the reasoning processes as well as the complexity of 
software tools and organisational bureaucracy.  Well-intentioned system and 
organisational design put in place to reduce mistakes (usually in the aftermath of an 
error) can led to overly cumbersome and conflicting processes. These may serve their 
primary goal (i.e., to mitigate against a particular mistake), but can have the 
unintended (but rather predictable) consequence of introducing or facilitating the 
occurrence of new mistakes and/or reduced insights.  By its very nature the data used 
in intelligence analysis is often opaque, incomplete, changing, misleading, and 
transitory.  Despite this, the analyst is expected to develop plausible hypotheses under 
the multiple stressors of time, workload and uncertain payoffs.  Added to this, the 
cognitive demands of causal reasoning are extremely taxing.  The adversary will be 
deliberately attempting to hide their activity and/or deceive the analyst about their 
intentions.  Combining all of these factors helps explain why it is difficult for the 
analyst to predict plausible hypotheses.  There may not be an obvious causal chain 
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and there is much evidence to suggest that human behaviour is non-linear and non-
deterministic in any case, and yet the analyst is expected to forecast likely events and 
scenarios.  Whilst this may seem like an impossible task, Hoffman et al offer the 
paradigm of sensemaking as a means of resolving some of the difficulties faced by the 
intelligence community. As a macro-cognitive approach, sensemaking has the 
advantage of studying collectives, such as teams, groups and organisations.  Moving 
the focus of analysis away from multiple cognitions of individuals to the collective 
cognition of a group or organisation might help develop new insights and 
breakthroughs in intelligence analysis. 
 
 
Decision-making in medicine and surgery 
 
Two of the papers in the special issue deal with critical thinking in the domains of 
medicine and surgery. 
 
Fioratou, Pauley and Flin (Critical thinking in the operating theatre) consider the 
critical thinking skills required by surgeons and anaesthetists in operating theatres.  
Alongside the technical skills associated with their respective disciplines of surgery 
and anaesthesia, surgeons and anaesthetists also require a range of ‘non-technical’ 
skills to deliver safe care to their patients. These are cognitive and behavioural skills – 
the former comprising skills like situation awareness and decision-making, the latter 
skills like good communication and teamworking in the operating theatre. Fioratou et 
al argue that these non-technical skills are underpinned by critical thinking that 
enables surgeons and anaesthetists to perform optimally as members of a wider 
clinical team and capitalise on their technical skills.  Emergency operations and 
changes to treatment or care management plans made preoperatively in response to 
unexpected or adverse events are noted as particularly demanding situations requiring 
critical thinking skills by surgeons and anaesthetists.  Fioratou et al note that although 
critical thinking is recognised as an important part of the operating teams skill set, 
very little research has been undertaken.  The authors identified three main methods 
that have been used to date for the empirical investigation of critical thinking within 
healthcare specialties: observations in situ, verbal protocols and interviews. Whilst 
each methods has a number of pros and cons, Fioratou et al report some evidence 
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from their own studies with operating theatre personnel using the Critical Decision 
Method (although this method does suffer from biases related to recall and 
introspection).  The Critical Decision Method was used to investigate the critical 
thinking skills of surgeons and anaesthetists in challenging situations.  A key finding 
is that particular nuances and cues of each situation as perceived by an anaesthetist 
play a significant part in the decision-making whether or not to convert from local to 
general anaesthetic – including the state of the patient and the nature of the external 
situation demands on the anaesthetist.  In a similar vein, the Critical Decision Method 
was also used to investigate surgeons’ decision to convert a laparoscopic procedure 
(more novel approach, linked to faster postoperative recovery, faster mobilisation and 
less pain for the patient) to a traditional open procedure (which can be significantly 
worse postoperatively for the patient). Again, situational nuances and cues, such as 
the state of the patient and demands on the surgeon, sway the decision whether to 
convert or not.  Finally, Fioratou et al make the point that critical thinking within the 
operating theatre should be analysed as an instance and within the wider context of 
‘distributed cognition’ in team – that is, knowledge and skills that are property of the 
wider operating theatre team – involving not only the surgeons and anaesthetists, but 
also the nurses and other health professionals, the patient, the monitoring equipment 
and other artefacts in the clinical environment.  Fioratou et al call for further research 
on critical thinking in surgery and anaesthesia to take place within the framework of 
distributed cognition.  
 
Schraagen (Dealing with unforeseen complexity in the operating room) first points 
out that although domain-specific expertise does not generally transfer easily from 
one domain to another, there are exceptions.  Expertise that is adaptive to novel 
environments, which has been termed ‘heedful performance’, allows operators to 
relate specific knowledge and skills to situational demands across a range of task 
domains by adapting flexibly to novel problem contexts. More specifically, the 
process of ‘heedful interrelating’ between individual operators is an apparent 
simplification of communication and coordination strategies when dealing with urgent 
demands.  Schraagen is somewhat critical of existing studies because they tend to 
present findings from brief observations and thus cannot contribute to an in-depth 
understanding of how teams dynamically adapt their strategies over time.  In order to 
study ‘heedful interrelating’ in a naturalistic environment (paediatric cardiac surgery), 
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Schraagen and colleagues undertook extended observations within a hospital 
operating room.  Observers coded the activity of the surgical team into four 
categories: explicit coordination (situation awareness and coordination); heedful 
interrelating (noticing and communicating, anticipating, maintaining standards, 
backup behaviours and closed-loop communication); support behaviours (support of 
others, backup behaviours and relational communication); and decision-making 
(problem diagnosis, risk assessment, option generation and outcome review).  The 
findings from the study showed that surgeons engaged in more explicit coordination 
than anaesthetists; anaesthetists, in contrast, engaged in more heedful interrelating 
than surgeons.  Counter to expectations, heedful interrelation did not increase in the 
more complex operations above what could be accounted for by the longer duration of 
the surgery.  Despite this, qualitative analysis of the data carried out by Schraagen 
revealed benefits of heedful interrelating. In cases of good surgical outcomes the 
activities of noticing and communicating, anticipating, maintaining standards, backup 
behaviours and closed-loop communication were qualitatively (although not 
quantitatively) better than in the cases of poor surgical outcomes.  From this pattern of 
findings, Schraagen concludes that both explicit coordination and heedful interrelating 
together can result in better performance in operating theatre teams, particularly when 
novel situations arise during anaesthesia or surgery. Additional research is also called 
for, as a number of questions remain unanswered, including how best to teach and 
train in heedful interrelating, and how this rather implicit communication and 
coordination process interacts with demands on operating theatre personnel’s 
attention during the management of demanding situations.  
 
 
Conclusions for critical thinking 
 
Consideration of the four papers in this special issue together shows remarkable 
similarities in the issues raised, despite the domain differences between intelligence 
analysis and decision-making in medicine and surgery.  From this review, some take-
home messages have been derived, as follows: 
 
 critical thinking comprises both thinking skill and meta-cognitive critique; 
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 adaptive problem solvers are most likely to be the best critical thinkers; 
 the combination of intuitive insight and formal analysis used concurrently is 
likely to provide the most successful predictions; 
 good critical thinkers are likely to be able to blend deep domain expertise and 
situational nuances with the interpersonal traits of persistence, creativity, 
reasoning and organisational skills; 
 simplification of communication and coordination strategies is useful when 
dealing with urgent situations; 
 explicit coordination and heedful interrelating together result in better team 
performance; and 
 the emergent nature of collective group cognition in sensemaking offers a 
potential new direction for research into critical thinking. 
 
In summary, it appears that there is considerable scope for further research into 
critical thinking, both with and between domains.  The papers presented within this 
special issue point the way. 
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